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A SEPARATION OF POWERS DEFENSE OF
FEDERAL RULEMAKING POWER
BY MICHAEL BLASIE *
Fundamental to the structure of our federal government is the
theory of the separation of powers;1 yet the Federal Constitution
contains no clause establishing such a structure. The most relevant
text appears in the following phrases: “All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,”2 “The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America,”3 and “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”4 These
clauses, combined with portions of the Federalist Papers and our
belief that the works of Locke and Montesquieu influenced the
Founding Fathers, are the sources from which we derive the concept of the separation of powers.5 On its face the theory is simple:
the three branches of the federal government exercise three corresponding functions. The legislative branch creates the law, the executive branch enforces the law, and the judicial branch interprets

* Associate, Cooley LLP; J.D., 2010, New York University School of Law. I
thank Professor Burt Neuborne for sparking my interest in this topic during his
class and for his guidance and advice.
1. “This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central
judgment of the Framers of the constitution that, within our political scheme, the
separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to
the preservation of liberty.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
3. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
4. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
5. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–98 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that separation of powers stems from three constitutional clauses and
referencing Federalist 47); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119–20 (1925) (discussing constitutional basis for the separation of powers); Tom Clark, Separation of Powers, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 1, 2 (1974) (noting that Madison appealed to
Montesquieu); JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT §§ 143–48, at 382–84 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1960) (1690); CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
151–52, 196–205 (Thomas Nugent trans. & ed., 1949); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
301 (James Madison) (New American Library ed., 1961).
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the law.6 However, application of the theory has proven to be
complicated.
There are two major competing theories of the separation of
powers: functionalism and formalism.7 Under the functionalist approach, the branches of government are interdependent and share
powers.8 Synonymous with pragmatism, functionalism assigns a
power to the branch or branches best capable of exercising that
power.9 In contrast, according to the formalist theory, each branch
may exert only the powers allocated to it by the Constitution under
a strict construction of the Constitution’s first three articles.10 Underlying this theory is the idea that structure itself is an effective
and necessary check on the massive power wielded by the federal
government. The structural requirement of inter-branch consensus
before government action, for example, safeguards individuals’
constitutional rights. Case law has appealed to both theories, causing the Supreme Court to acknowledge that its “precedents in this
area do not admit of easy synthesis.”11
Judicial rulemaking—the methods by which federal courts create federal procedural rules—represents a paradigmatic clash between the functionalist and formalist theories of the separation of
powers. There exist compelling practical reasons to invest such
power in the judiciary, yet the Constitution’s text does not explicitly
confer such power on any branch. Scholarship on the subject generally approves of the current process based on a classic functionalist separation of powers justification: the systemic benefits of the
6. The closely related principle of checks and balances allows branches to
negate some of the functions allocated to other branches without permitting a
usurping of such powers. For example, Congress can write laws but the President
can veto them; the veto power, however, grants only the power to negate the law,
not the power to write laws.
7. Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act
and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1291–92 (1992) (referencing competing theories as formalist or functionalist).
8. Id. at 1292.
9. Often this view rests upon traditional assumptions about the benefits of
each branch: the executive is efficient and specialized, the judiciary is insulated
and familiar with the application of laws to cases, and the legislature is representative of the citizenry and capable of debate and compromise. See Bruce E. Peabody
& John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of Separation of the Powers, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 22 (2003) (noting that positivist view relies in part upon distinctive qualities
and functions associated with each branch or division of government).
10. Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1291.
11. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986);
see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–83 (1989) (explaining recent
separation of powers jurisprudence and concepts of encroachment and
aggrandizement).
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process outweigh the defects, partly because the judiciary is best
equipped to make the rules that guide it.12
This Note comprehensively examines the separation of powers
issues raised by the current federal rulemaking process under the
formalist theory of the separation of powers in light of modern precedent. Part I details the current procedure for creating the federal
rules, summarizes the relevant scholarship, and examines the few
Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of portions of the
process. Part II clarifies the process of creating the federal rules of
procedure, concluding that, despite the substantive role played by
rulemaking committees and Congress’s influence over the process,
the Supreme Court creates the rules. Part III describes the statutory
and constitutional sources of power that federal courts have referenced in creating the rules and the viable constitutional bases for
these sources. It draws conclusions about both the limits on Congress’s regulation of federal court procedure and limits on a federal
court’s constitutional power to create procedure. Part IV examines
why the Constitution permits Congress’s delegation of such power
despite potential conflicts with the non-delegation doctrine, the
Case or Controversy Clause, and the Judicial Power Clause. Part V
discusses potential constitutional challenges to Congress’s “legislative veto” over rules promulgated by the Supreme Court and to the
supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act.13
12. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES
54 (1977) (“The rule-making power is one of the most important examples of
practical necessity dictating that a twilight area be created where activities of the
separate branches merge.”); Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12
A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926) (arguing that courts should have complete control over
court procedure); cf. WEINSTEIN, supra, at 33 (“It appears, therefore, that no one of
the three branches of Government is, by the theory of the Constitution or the
character of the duty, so peculiarly fitted for this work that the other two must be
excluded from consideration. In such a position, the guiding principle becomes
one of expediency.”) (citation omitted). What little mention there is of formalist
separation of powers justification focuses on the need of the judiciary to control its
own procedure to remain an independent branch of government: “Rule-making,
in this view, is a crucial facet of an independent judiciary; to deprive the judiciary
[of] rule-making authority is to mar its vital independence and impair its role as a
guardian of due process.” Id. at 21. Judge Weinstein later noted Hamilton’s emphasis on an independent judiciary in the Federalist Papers. Id. at 75–82. However,
one scholar argues that Congress will blame judges for problems with the judgedominated Judicial Conference’s rules, thereby hurting judicial independence.
Stephen C. Yeazell, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Judging Rules, Ruling
Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 241 (1998).
13. This Note will argue that what some commentators have referred to as a
“legislative veto” is actually a simple notice requirement. See infra Part IV.
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I.
BACKGROUND
A. Federal Rulemaking Process
This section details the statutory authority and procedures for
the creation of the federal rules of procedure. The Rules Enabling
Act (REA)14 declares that the Supreme Court of the United States
“shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases” in federal courts.15 However, these rules “shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.”16 Also noteworthy, the statute contains what is
known as the supersession clause, which voids all laws conflicting
with the rules promulgated under this statute.17 The federal rules
of evidence, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and appellate procedure fall under the language of “general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence.”18 Congress later granted the Supreme Court near-identical authority to create bankruptcy rules.19
According to the REA, the Supreme Court must submit each
rule promulgated under this act’s authority to Congress.20 The proposed rules take effect only if Congress fails to veto them,21 with
one exception: rules “creating, abolishing, or modifying” evidentiary privileges require an act of Congress.22
Despite the language of the REA, most rules are developed not
by the United States Supreme Court, but by a congressionally created body known as the Judicial Conference, whose mission is to
develop rules and evaluate those currently in effect.23 It is com14. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). See generally Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of
Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116,
1117–19 (1933) (detailing history of passage of Rules Enabling Act).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
16. Id. This provision prompted the great substance versus procedure debate
that led to the Erie, York, and Hanna line of cases; which rules are procedural and
which are substantive is an ongoing debate amongst scholars and courts. See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
18. See 30 F.R.D. 73, 101 (1962); WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 57–74, 100.
19. This Note, however, focuses primarily on the rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence created under the REA.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).
21. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893 (1999) (noting that vetos
are rarely used).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).
23. Id. § 331.
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posed of the Chief Justice of the United States, the chief judge of
every federal circuit court, the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each circuit.24 The Chief
Justice of the United States must submit an annual report to Congress on the Judicial Conference along with its recommendations
for legislation.25 The Conference may hold hearings, take testimony, and issue subpoenas,26 and it may also create advisory committees to recommend and assist in the creation of rules.27 After a
proposal passes an advisory committee, the Conference’s standing
committee reviews the proposal.28
These two types of committees generally include members of
the bar, law professors, state chief justices, a Department of Justice
representative, and federal judges, with a law professor serving as
the reporter in the case of an advisory committee.29 Notably, Congress required such committees to consist of members of the bar as
well as both trial and appellate judges,30 though the Chief Justice of
the United States has the sole authority to make all committee
appointments.31
The Conference tends to welcome outside participation in the
process. For example, suggestions for rule amendments come from
members of the Judicial Conference and its committees, judges at
every level, organizations, attorneys, agencies, law professors, and
the public.32 Also, committee meetings and minutes are usually
24. Id. For information on the predecessors to the Judicial Conference, see
the U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited January 17, 2010).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2006). The Conference may also place limits on
membership. For information on the tenure of committee members see the U.S.
Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx.
28. The text of section 2073 suggests the Conference must create a standing
committee, whereas the language in section 331 suggests that the Conference may,
but is not required to, create such a committee. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(b) (2006). Regardless, the Conference traditionally has had a standing
committee.
29. See also WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 9–12, 25–27 (1981) (discussing membership
of advisory and standing committees); U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.
gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (containing
links to lists of current committee members).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2).
31. U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Judicial
Conference.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011); BROWN, supra note 29, at 13–15.
32. U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Federal
Rulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011); BROWN, supra
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public.33 Although not required by statute, advisory committees
send their rule proposals to over ten thousand people and organizations for comment and provide the general public with six
months to comment on their proposals.34
The general process of drafting by an advisory committee, followed by approval from the standing committee, Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, with submission of the rules to
Congress has been, with few exceptions, the procedure for decades.35 There are several notable observations about this process.
First, the REA grants the Supreme Court the power to create rules
but does not require the Court to exert that power. Second, the
REA does not require the Court to use the Judicial Conference to
promulgate rules. Third, the Supreme Court need not follow the
recommendations of the Judicial Conference. In the past, the Supreme Court has rejected,36 modified,37 and taken no action38 on
proposed rules.39

note 29, at 9–11 (noting that suggestions for rule amendments come from variety
of public and governmental sources).
33. U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Federal
Rulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011); see also
BROWN, supra note 29, at 17–23.
34. U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Judicial
Conference.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Administrative
Procedure Act) (rule 12.3.2).
35. Congress has intervened only rarely in the rulemaking process. See Karen
Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1054–1060 (1992) (tracing Congress’s role in amending rules). For a general discussion of the history of proposed rules and Congress’s
reaction to them, see WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 57–74, 100.
36. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 100 (noting that court rejected proposed
work product rule because of pending case).
37. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 31; 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2008) (describing how
Supreme Court made changes to first proposed set of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
38. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, at § 1006 (referencing 1955 rule
proposals); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 843 (1993) (noting that Court refused to transmit amendment implicating foreign relations).
39. There is a separate rulemaking process for, and separate bodies that develop and review, the creation of a federal court’s local rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 331
(2008); 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2002); 28 U.S.C § 2071 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b)
(1990). This Note focuses on the federal rules applicable to all federal courts, but
its analysis likely applies with equal force to the local rules.
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B. Scholarship
Since the inception of the Judicial Conference, scholars have
criticized and made suggestions to improve the rulemaking process.
Almost all proposed modifications suggested more public access,
more expansive membership in the Judicial Conference, debates
on the role of the United States Supreme Court, or discussions
about how active Congress should be in the process.40 Aside from
these practical critiques, the theoretical and constitutional critiques
have focused on two issues. First, even with the limitation that rules
cannot abridge or modify substantive rights, procedural rules, such
as those concerning pleadings and class actions, have profound substantive implications for litigants.41 Therefore, issues of democratic
process and accountability arise from the magnitude of procedural
power and present themselves in criticisms of the membership of
the Judicial Conference, public access to the process, the role of the
legislature, and the degree of judicial scrutiny.42 Second, the role of
federal judges, especially the United States Supreme Court and its
Chief Justice, has caused concerns about the ability of courts to re-

40. See, e.g., 368 U.S. 1011, 1012–14 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (preferring
that Congress amend Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly); BROWN, supra
note 29, at 79–86 (evaluating five different proposals); Yeazell, supra note 12, at
239–48 (supporting elimination of Supreme Court and Judicial Conference from
process because neither provides meaningful judicial review, and encouraging
greater transparency by increasing number and types of attorneys and judges consulted); cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.L. REV. 795, 832–34, 838–42, 856 (1990) (describing benefits and costs of increased participation and concluding that opening
rulemaking process to more participants risks influx of lobbying and loss of neutrality, but that keeping process closed risks abdicating power to Congress).
41. See CHARLES W. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION, ACCESS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 11–13 (American Judicature Society 1978) (arguing that procedure inevitably effects substantive rights); Mullenix, supra note 40, at 835–56
(“Those few who observe judicial rulemaking are far more likely today to see social
and economic consequences in what the Committee does than were earlier generations of observers . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for ReExamination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579–83 (1975) (citing limited attorney and public
participation, and criticizing lack of legislative control over process); GRAU, supra
note 41, at 1–13 (noting simultaneous independence and unaccountability of
rulemakers). But see Bone, supra note 22, at 890 (arguing that judiciary is better
able to identify legal principles and trends and that legitimacy of rules stems from
principled deliberation similar to common law reasoning rather than from public
participation).
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view the rules impartially and about their influence over the Judicial Conference.43
Despite these concerns, the vast majority of scholars, courts,
legislatures, and organizations approve of the Judicial Conference’s
role and procedures and, more generally, the creation of the rules
by the judicial branch.44 Indeed, the judiciary has had authority to
author procedural rules for the vast majority of the history of the
United States45 and United Kingdom.46 Inevitably, scholars conducting cost-benefit analyses have concluded that the judiciary
makes “better” procedural rules than the legislature for at least two
reasons.47 First, the judiciary is well suited for this responsibility
with its unique expertise in procedure from its daily experiences.48
Second, it is more efficient for the courts to make such rules because the judiciary can add, amend, and delete rules more quickly
43. See, e.g., 374 U.S. 861, 865–70 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at x–xi, 5-11, 96–104 (noting lack of public comment
and adversarial system in process; citing concern for impartiality and breadth of
Court’s interpretation of procedure, Congress injuring Court’s prestige when it
uses legislative veto, and Chief Justice’s influence over committee choices). But see
Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUD.
SOC. 250, 256–58 (1962) (defending role of Supreme Court in rulemaking
process).
44. BROWN, supra note 29, at 36 (“[M]ost imply little or no criticism of the way
in which the rule makers have discharged their responsibility or of the way the
rules have operated to regulate practice and procedure.”); GRAU, supra note 41, at
17 (reviewing proposals of scholars Pound, Wigmore, Levien, Amsterdam, Joiner,
Miller, and Weinstein).
45. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 57–74; Edson R. Sunderland, Implementing the Rule-Making Power, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27, 29–32 (1950). Sunderland also
discusses the history of rulemaking processes amongst states. Id. at 35–40.
46. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 22–33; Abraham Gertner, The Inherent Power
of Courts to Make Rules, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 32, 32–38 (1936).
47. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284,
1287–88, 1291–92 (1977) (defending current method against criticism).
48. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 19–21 (concluding that courts are better
positioned than legislatures to determine their own procedural and evidentiary
needs); Bone, supra note 21, at 890, 920–27, 935–37, 949 (arguing that judiciary is
better able to identify legal principles and trends and that legitimacy of rules stems
from principled deliberation similar to common law reasoning rather than from
public participation). But see Hazard, supra note 47, at 1293 (“[I]t seems fair to say
that it is not the superior expertise of the judiciary in such matters but rather these
political circumstances that have been the real impetus for removing procedural
Rulemaking from the legislature.”). Those noting judicial expertise neglect, however, the fact that many Members of Congress lack daily experience with environmental, insurance, and criminal issues; yet Congress retains control over these
arenas.
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than the legislature,49 which allows the legislature more time to
spend on “bigger issues.”50
In recent decades, discussions of the constitutionality of federal judicial rulemaking have come up rarely. One possible explanation for this is that many of the concerns about membership and
public access have been addressed by congressional amendments
and changes to the Judicial Conference’s procedure, negating the
largest cause for criticism.51 Also, the federal rules have long been
considered a success; by all indications the process works well, so
there is little reason to exert resources advocating change.52 Third,
with the rise of administrative agencies, the legal profession has become accustomed to functionalist reasoning, often emphasizing efficiency and the role of experts.53 This view leaves unaddressed the
issue of whether a formalist analysis can support the current federal
rulemaking process.
C. Supreme Court Decisions
Debate about the validity of the rules rarely focuses on the separation of powers. Instead, the Supreme Court has focused on
49. Pound, supra note 12, at 602 (noting that judiciary can gradually and conservatively overhaul and reshape rules, that rules change with legal growth instead
of waiting years for legislative intervention, and that rules are less rigid and can be
tried and molded); see also Bone, supra note 21, at 927–30 (noting flexibility and
discretion in rules versus strictness of statutes).
50. James Wm. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking,
84 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1974) (noting that Congress lacks staff and is unlikely to duplicate Judicial Conference committees because most members are unpaid and may
be unwilling to work for Congress; and also noting that Judicial Conference affords
premium time for scholarly examination of rules); Pound, supra note 12, at 602.
51. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1958)
(claiming that concerns about courts not exercising rulemaking power, lack of
public hearings and techniques, and concern about role of Supreme Court have
all been quelled by history); Moore, supra note 35, at 1062-64 (1992) (discussing
Judicial Improvements Act); Mullenix, supra note 40, at 832 (discussing impact of
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act).
52. Moore & Bendix, supra note 50, at 1, 11 (“As finally promulgated by the
Court, the rules are well conceived and structured, neither radical nor conservative, and thoroughly professional.”); Hazard, supra note 47, at 1294 (“A quite undemocratic legislative process has proven capable of producing a very satisfactory
product. Correlatively, the archetype of institutionalized democracy—the legislature—has mishandled the same work when it has gotten it.”); John H. Wigmore, A
Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft—Three Larger Aspects of the Work Which Require
Further Consideration, 22 A.B.A. J. 811, 811–12 (1936) (discussing American Bar Association’s long-time advocacy of judiciary writing procedural rules).
53. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12–21 (noting expansion of government and growing power of judiciary).
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whether the federal rules were made within the authority granted
by the REA.54 In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,55 the Supreme Court held that parties can contest the validity of rules made
under the REA.56 It later established a presumption of validity for
all of the federal rules.57 This analysis implies that the REA is constitutionally valid.58
Other precedents discussing rulemaking power likely foreclose
contests to the constitutionality of the bulk of the REA. In Hanna v.
Plumer,59 the Court referenced Congress’s power to make rules of
practice and pleading in federal courts.60 In Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co.,61 the Court held that Congress can regulate federal court procedure and can delegate this authority to federal courts.62 Later, in
Mistretta v. United States,63 the Court suggested in dicta that this delegation of power was constitutional and that Congress has the authority to create entities like the Judicial Conference.64
Although these cases suggest that the REA’s delegation of
power is constitutional, no court has ever justified the process
against all potential separation of powers challenges. To remain
constitutional, the rules must survive more than a non-delegation
challenge. Further, courts and scholars alike have overlooked rudi54. Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A
Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 44–45 (1988).
55. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
56. Id. (contesting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)); see also Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447,
449–50 (W.D. Wash., 1978) (discussing constitutionality of Supplemental Rule
B(1) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
57. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1987) (noting that presumption stemmed from approval by advisory committee, Supreme Court, and review by Congress); see Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)
(noting that meaning of rules given by Advisory Committee warrants special
weight). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(claiming that integrity of federal rules is absolute because of availability of review
by advisory committee, judicial conference, and Court). There is, however, no indication that this presumption applies to local rules, which neither the Supreme
Court nor Congress reviews.
58. For examples of cases challenging the constitutionality of local rules and
not referencing a presumption of validity, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973), Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), and United
States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098 (2d Cir. 1975).
59. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
60. Id. at 471–72.
61. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
62. Id. at 9–10.
63. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
64. Id. at 387–89.
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mentary decisions and classifications about who or what makes the
federal rules and under what authority. The answers to these issues
are prerequisites to a separation of powers analysis.
II.
WHO MAKES THE RULES?
A. Background
Depending on who makes the rules and within which branch
they operate, different constitutional restraints, requirements, and
concerns apply. Thus, knowing which branch asserts rulemaking
power is imperative to a separation of powers analysis. Although
this Note agrees with virtually all other scholarship in determining
that the judicial branch makes the rules,65 it takes the extra step of
exploring the basis for this conclusion. This Note concludes, based
on an analysis of statutory text and Supreme Court opinions, that
the power to make the federal rules lies with the Supreme Court,
acting as the head the judicial branch.
The first question concerning the federal rules is whether the
Judicial Conference or the Supreme Court makes the rules. Under
the REA, the Supreme Court may promulgate rules of practice and
procedure. This suggests that the power belongs to the Supreme
Court; but the Court has suggested that, in practice, the Judicial
Conference makes the rules.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the central role the Judicial Conference plays in the rulemaking process. In Murphree,66 the
Court noted that although it promulgates the rules, lower courts
should give substantial weight to the Advisory Committee’s construction of the rules.67 Bolstering the reasoning behind such a
claim is the Chief Justice’s cover letter to Congress in the 1993
transmission of suggested rule amendments: “While the Court is
satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this
transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would
have proposed these amendments in the form submitted.”68 In the
same message, Justice White, although noting that the Court reviews the proposed rules thoroughly and does not “rubber stamp”
65. Universally, scholars and courts assume that the judicial branch creates all
of the federal rules, barring an explicit statute on point. See infra notes 72–75 and
accompanying text.
66. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
67. Id. at 444.
68. 146 F.R.D. 401, 403 (1993).
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the proposals,69 stated that Congress could not have intended the
Supreme Court to be a full layer of review because it would take too
much of the Court’s time, and the Judicial Conference is far better
equipped to make decisions about the rules.70
Despite acknowledging the large role the Judicial Conference
plays, the Court has consistently maintained that the rulemaking
power resides with the Court. In Sibbach, the Court explained that
“Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to
this or other federal courts authority to make rules . . . .”71 The Mistretta
Court noted, “Pursuant to this power to delegate rulemaking authority to the Judicial Branch, Congress expressly has authorized
this Court to establish rules . . . .”72 In both cases the Court established explicitly that the authority had been delegated to the Court.
Statutory language supports this position. In Mistretta, the
Court affirmed its earlier holding that the REA “conferred upon
the Judiciary the power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure,”73 citing to § 2072 (granting the Supreme Court rulemaking
power) and not to §§ 2073–75 (discussing the process of rulemaking via the Judicial Conference). The statutory text supports the
69. Justice White cited some of the many dissents over history and one instance where the Court refused to transmit a proposal. Id. at 502, 505; see also, e.g.,
368 U.S. 1011, 1012–14 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (contesting one proposed
rule as contrary to congressional policy); 383 U.S. 1029, 1032, 1034 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing that some of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure border on being unconstitutional); 461 U.S. 1117, 1119 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with ambiguous language of one rule). But see Krugler v. Helfant,
421 U.S. 1019, 1022 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court is
acting as rubber stamp).
70. 146 F.R.D. 401, 505 (1993) (“Hence, as I have seen the Court’s role over
the years, it is to transmit the Judicial Conference’s recommendations without
change and without careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee system has not operated with integrity.”). Justice White also mentioned that
on multiple occasions he had serious questions about the wisdom of some amendments, yet voted to pass them anyway. Id. at 505; cf. 383 U.S. 1029, 1032 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“Whether by this transmittal the individual members of the
Court who voted to transmit the rules intended to express approval of the varied
policy decisions the rules embody I am not sure. I am reasonably certain, however,
that the Court’s transmittal does not carry with it a decision that the amended
rules are all constitutional. For such a decision would be the equivalent of an advisory opinion which, I assume the Court would unanimously agree, we are without
constitutional power to give.”).
71. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 24 (1941) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
72. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989).
73. Id. at 383 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
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Court’s conclusion because the Judicial Conference can only “recommend” rules to the Supreme Court.74 Further, there is no requirement that the Supreme Court must rely upon or obtain the
consent of the Judicial Conference; it is an independent grant of
rulemaking authority.75
Thus, based on statutory text and precedent, the Judicial Conference is a tool Congress supplied to the Supreme Court to exercise the Court’s powers under § 2072. History suggests that this was
necessary; the Supreme Court often failed to act under its independent grant of rulemaking authority.76 A body charged with continually evaluating the rules would likely prompt the Supreme Court to
act.77 Therefore, Justice White is likely correct that, in practice, the
Judicial Conference, and particularly its committees, plays the most
substantive role in the creation of the rules, but, as a matter of law,
the power of federal rulemaking rests with the Supreme Court.78
B. Fitting the Rule-Makers Into a Branch of Government
Having decided who makes the rules, the second inquiry requires determining within which branch the Supreme Court acts
when it exerts its rulemaking power.79 The rulemaking process
does not permit a claim that the executive branch exerts rulemaking power.80 Aside from the presidential power to appoint federal
judges and the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the existence of
Department of Justice representatives on the Judicial Conference,
the executive branch has no control over the appointments and
tenure of members of the Judicial Conference, nor any control over
the content of proposals or their approval. At best, the executive
has some influence, but certainly no actual control over the
process.
One could more plausibly argue that the legislature exerts federal rulemaking power. An advocate of this stance would argue that
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994).
75. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (giving examples of Court
being proactive or rejecting or modifying conference’s recommendations).
76. See Eli J. Warach, Note, The Rule-Making Power: Subject to Law?, 5 RUTGERS
L. REV. 376, 388–90 (1951).
77. Id.
78. 374 U.S. 861, 869–70 (1963) (Black, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting) (recommending giving power to Judicial Conference but acknowledging that currently
the Supreme Court makes rules).
79. This Note assumes that, under the formalist view, power must rest with
and be exerted by one branch.
80. Executive control over agencies and their internal operating procedure is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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the REA drafts the Justices and other members of the federal judiciary into a legislative agency or committee. As far-fetched as this may
seem, there is support for the point. First, many non-Article III personnel sit on the rulemaking committees.81 Second, at least one
court has described the Supreme Court as acting in an administrative, non-judicial capacity when it evaluates the proposed rules.82
Similarly, the Supreme Court has described a state supreme court
as acting in a legislative capacity when prescribing a code of ethics.83 Third, the Supreme Court has labeled its control over the federal rulemaking process as control of an “extrajudicial” activity.84
These arguments, however, do not establish whether the legislature or the judiciary exerts authority. Rather, they prompt questions about whether Congress can delegate non-judicial
responsibilities to the federal courts and whether it can create an
independent agency, composed of Article III and non-Article III
members, within the judiciary. The Court answered both of these
questions in the affirmative.85 Therefore, neither the exertion of
non-judicial powers by federal judges and the Supreme Court, nor
the mixed membership and independent agency status of the Judicial Conference, prohibits placement in the judiciary.86
Ultimately, the argument that federal rulemaking authority
rests with the legislative branch turns on the role of legislative inaction. The Supreme Court must present all of its proposed rules to
Congress, which could intervene in the process and reject the
rule.87 But just as a president’s vetoing a bill rather than signing it
81. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 9–12; U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011).
82. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450
F.Supp. 447 , 449–50 (W.D. Wash., 1978).
83. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 722–27,
734 (1980) (holding that members of Virginia Supreme Court had legislative immunity when acting in their legislative capacity by disciplining attorneys and prescribing code of ethics).
84. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389–90 (1989); see infra Part III.C.
85. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The case concerned the constitutionality of
the United States Sentencing Commission, a body composed of some federal
judges and some non-Article III appointees of the President that Congress placed
explicitly in the judicial branch. Id. at 368–69, 385–86.
86. See Stephen C. Garvito, Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 1059, 1078-79 (1974) (arguing that Judicial Conference can give
advisory opinions because it is not a strictly judicial organ, is not sitting as a court
of law, and is not a high court.).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008).
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does not mean he makes the law, Congress’s authority to veto the
proposed rules does not mean it makes the rules.
In the seminal Sibbach case, the Court was clear that Congress
had delegated rulemaking authority to the judiciary: “Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal
courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other
federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States.”88 The Court continued:
“That no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates, at least,
that no transgression of legislative policy was found.”89 Thus, the
majority placed emphasis on Congress’ reaction, or lack thereof, to
the rules. Years later, the Court reinforced this stance in Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.,90 stating
that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not enacted by
Congress, but Congress participates in the rulemaking process.”91
There, the Court also held that a rule passed through such a process will only fail if the advisory committee, the Supreme Court, and
Congress erred, thus establishing a strong presumption of validity
for most federal rules.92 Although Congress participates, as Justice
Frankfurter noted in his Sibbach dissent, “Plainly, the Rules are not
acts of Congress and cannot be treated as such.”93
Therefore, the specific language in Sibbach and Business Guides
establishes unmistakably that the judicial branch exerts rulemaking
power under the REA, whereas the language about Congress’s role
refers to whether or not the rule at issue conflicts with congressional policy.94
88. 312 U.S. 1, 3 (1941).
89. Id. at 6.
90. 498 U.S. 533, 552 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is not fee-shifting statute).
91. Id. at 552 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 552 (citation omitted); see Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S.
1, 6–8 (1987) (granting presumptive constitutional validity to all federal rules because advisory committee and Supreme Court approve them and Congress reviews
them); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Since
the members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court
who formulated the Federal Rules are presumably reasonable men, it follows that
the integrity of the Federal Rules is absolute.”).
93. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 6 (1941). Frankfurter continued,
“Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions
surrounding the business of Congress when the rules were submitted, to draw any
inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”
Id.
94. Nonetheless, the Court’s repeated emphasis on the role of Congress in
the process and the presumption of validity it correspondingly granted to the rules
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III.
UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY DOES THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH MAKE THE RULES?
A. Background
Once it is established that the judiciary makes the rules, the
next separation of powers inquiry seeks to determine under what
authority the judicial branch makes rules. The text of the Constitution details the sources of authority for all branches of the federal
government. Congress has four constitutional sources of power to
regulate the federal courts. Congress may “establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States,”95 “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,”96
and “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”97 The Constitution only
creates one court, the United States Supreme Court.98 Congress’s
fourth power is the power to create every other federal court and
control every detail about those courts, such as location, the number of judges, and the standard of review.99 Congress controls the
jurisdiction of these lower federal courts100 and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.101
In contrast, federal courts have little explicit constitutional
power beyond the phrase, “The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”102
Furthermore, this judicial power only extends to cases or controveris reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s approach to separation of powers in Youngstown.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (referencing 343 U.S. 549,
638–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
95. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. art III, § 1.
99. Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 200–201 (2001).
100. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (holding that Congress must grant jurisdiction for federal court to hear case).
101. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (holding that Congress’s
repealing of court jurisdiction over pending habeas case deprived court of jurisdiction to hear case).
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (holding that historical and constitutional reasoning
allows some judicial power to be vested in legislative branch, thus allowing very
limited types of Article I courts to have Article III judicial power).
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sies,103 which limits the judicial power of Article III courts to powers
associated with the adversarial process.104 There is thus a strong
concern with advisory opinions in the current process of promulgating rules for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court approves the
rules submitted via the Judicial Conference and thus potentially
evaluates their constitutionality outside of a case or controversy.
Second, during the rulemaking process federal courts make rules
applicable to cases generally and not as applied to a specific conflict
between particular parties.105
B. Federal Courts Have Statutory Authority to Create Procedural Rules
The first premise of a statutory authority argument—the notion that Congress has delegated the power to make rules to the
federal courts—is that Congress has the power to make the rules
governing federal courts. This is because Congress cannot delegate
to the judiciary power that it does not have.106 The Court has consistently recognized this premise. In the oft-cited 1825 case of Way103. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356
(1911) (“As we have already seen, by the express terms of the Constitution, the
exercise of the judicial power is limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Beyond this
it does not extend, and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the
meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.”);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–96, 99 (1967).
104. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 96 (“The oldest and most consistent thread in the
federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.”). Even after deciding if a rule is valid constitutionally, there may be additional inquiries into whether or not it applies to a particular case, hence the Erie
doctrine. See 19 ALLAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4501 (3d. ed. 2008). For explanations on the constitutional ban on advisory opinions, see WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 50–55; Garvito, supra note 86, at
1076.
105. “Whether by this transmittal the individual members of the Court who
voted to transmit the rules intended to express approval of the varied policy decisions the rules embody I am not sure. I am reasonably certain, however, that the
Court’s transmittal does not carry with it a decision that the amended rules are all
constitutional. For such a decision would be the equivalent of an advisory opinion
which, I assume the Court would unanimously agree, we are without constitutional
power to give.” 383 U.S. 1029, 1032 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Jack B. Weinstein, Rendering Advisory Opinions—Do We, Should We?, 54 JUDICATURE 140, 140
(1970).
106. “The rulemaking power delegated by Congress to the Supreme Court is
limited in scope to those powers that the Congress could have rightfully exercised.” Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450
F.Supp. 447, 450 (W.D. Wash. 1978). See also Whitten, supra note 54, at 69 (arguing
that Congress has control exclusively even if it does not act). Additionally, even if
Congress has a power, there may be constitutional barriers to it delegating that
power to another branch.
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man v. Southard,107 the Court established that Congress has the
power to make laws regarding the execution of judgments by the
judiciary, explaining “[t]hat a power to make laws for carrying into
execution all the judgments which the judicial department has
power to pronounce, is expressly conferred by [the Necessary and
Proper Clause], seems to be one of those plain propositions which
reasoning cannot render plainer.”108 Ten years later in 1835, the
Court reinforced the view that Congress has the power to regulate
the jurisdictional and rulemaking authority of the federal courts by
holding that Congress has the power to create inferior courts
“[a]nd that the power to ordain and establish, carries with it the
power to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such
courts, admits of as little doubt.”109 Thus, the power to create the
courts includes the power to regulate their procedure. That same
year, the Court upheld the delegation of procedural rulemaking
authority to the federal courts and the Supreme Court by the Process Acts of 1789.110 Later, in Sibbach, the Court wrote that “Congress has the power to regulate federal practice and procedure, and
may delegate to the courts power to make rules not inconsistent
with the Constitution or acts of Congress.”111 In 1992, the Court
reaffirmed this position.112 Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal court has challenged Congress’s authority over rulemaking or
107. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). The Court continued, “The courts, for
example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing
of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It
will not be contended that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not be
conferred on the judicial department.” Id. at 43.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (13 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835).
110. Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329, 360 (1835).
111. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941). Later, in Hanna, the Court
wrote,
[T]he constitutional provision for the federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make
rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification
as either.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965).
112. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) (“Congress, acting
pursuant to its authority to make all laws ‘necessary and proper’ to [the] establishment [of the lower federal courts], also may enact laws regulating the conduct of
those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced.”).
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its power to modify this process,113 and at least one court has
pointed to the delegation theory as the locus of power for Congress
to give or rescind the authority of the courts to make the rules or
override the rules by statute.114
The second premise of a statutory authority argument is that
the Supreme Court has relied upon the congressional delegation
via the REA as the source of its power to promulgate the rules. As
the Court explained in Hanna,
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized
power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal
courts . . . . To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.115
The unmistakable language of the Supreme Court’s holdings
throughout American history establishes that the Court has and
does promulgate the federal rules under the authority delegated to
it by the REA. Indeed, “the [notion that] Federal courts have
power, or may be empowered, to make rules of procedure for the
conduct of litigation has been settled for a century.”116 Accordingly,
as the preeminent treatise on civil procedure declares,
The whole history of federal judicial procedure, the submission of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the amendments thereto to Congress in accordance with the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, and the decisions of the Supreme Court,
all are premised on the authority of Congress to make procedural rules and to delegate that power to the Supreme
Court.117
113. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 104; see also Whitten, supra note 54, at 54–56
(arguing that text and history of Article III courts demonstrates that Congress,
exclusively, has controlled makeup of federal courts); Richard S. Ka, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1975)
(critiquing Connecticut Supreme Court decision and favoring legislative power
over judicial supremacy because the latter is unchecked power).
114. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 134–35 (noting that Court did so with evidentiary privileges).
115. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74; see also BROWN, supra note 29, at 39.
116. 30 F.R.D. 73, 101 (1962). Most scholars conclude that the judiciary creates the federal rules under the delegated authority of the REA. See, e.g., Bone,
supra note 21, at 889–97; Yeazell, supra note 12, at 232–35, 243–44.
117. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, at, § 1001. As one submission of proposed federal rules to Congress noted, “[T]he [notion that] Federal courts have
power, or may be empowered, to make rules of procedure for the conduct of litiga-
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C. Federal Courts Rely, in Part, on Inherent Authority to Create Rules
The statutory authority argument fails to address two crucial
scenarios. First, it fails to account for court rules outside the bounds
of, or filling the gaps of, the federal rules. Second, there may exist
constitutional authority to make some or all of the rules, but courts
have not had to address this issue because of the REA’s wide grant
of statutory authority118 and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.119 Federal and state courts have asserted an “inherent authority” to create rules in both of these scenarios.120 In fact, despite 28
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988), granting the Supreme Court and all federal courts authority to prescribe rules of conduct for themselves,
federal courts have chosen, in select situations, to exert an alternative inherent power to make the rules.121
tion has been settled for a century.” 30 F.R.D. 73, 101. One of the standing committee’s preliminary reports on the issuance of the Federal Rules of Evidence
asserted that the Supreme Court had power to promulgate those rules because it
had authority under the REA, had rulemaking power for over one-hundred years,
evidentiary rules are procedural and not substantive, and portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure that had already been passed concerned
evidence. Id. at 100–03.
118. See Gertner, supra note 46, at 44–48 (discussing redundancy of some
state enabling statutes with inherent power, but noting that it may function to
stimulate court use of procedural power).
119. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comms. Enters., 498 U.S. 533,
564–68 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (holding that Rule 11 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is not fee-shifting statute) (“The rules we prescribe have a statutory
authorization and need not always track the inherent authority of the federal
courts. At the same time, the further our rules depart from our traditional practices, the more troubling the question of our rulemaking authority . . . Congress
desired the courts to regulate ‘practice and procedure’ an area where we have
expertise and some degree of inherent authority . . . the construction of Rule 11
adopted today extends our role far beyond its traditional and accepted boundaries.”); see also Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 51, 64 (1825)
(holding that all courts need not rely on their inherent power to command officers to comply with their duty because statutory authority exists).
120. See infra note 162 and accompanying text; Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.,
757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Arthur J. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress,
and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 669 (1973) (describing how thenretired Justice Goldberg argued that portions of the rules of evidence were beyond
Court’s “inherent and delegated authority,” thus acknowledging existence of inherent authority).
121. One explanation for this may be that the grant of authority to district
courts under § 2071 applies to rules made by the entire district court and thus
does not bestow any authority upon individual judges to create rules. Whether a
district court can create a rule delegating such power to its judges is an interesting
question. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988).
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There are two absolutist positions on rulemaking authority.
The first position asserts that courts have inherent authority to control all of their own procedure, and the legislature cannot interfere
or override this prerogative.122 Dean Roscoe Pound, the main proponent of this position, based this conclusion on primarily historical criteria, noting the judicial control of procedure in the United
Kingdom and colonies.123 Others have cited the freedom the legislature and executive enjoy in shaping their own procedure.124 For
example, John Wigmore asserted that courts may regulate their
own procedure because of the limited enumerated powers of Congress, the broad grant of authority to courts under the Judicial
Power Clause, and the practical advantages of efficiency and neutrality that courts have over the legislature.125 For similar reasons,
many state courts have reached the same conclusion under their
respective state constitutions.126 Yet, regardless of its merits, no federal court has adopted this position.127
The other absolutist position is that Congress can control every
aspect of federal courts by virtue of both its authority to create the
lower federal courts and its powers under the Necessary and Proper
122. Pound, supra note 12, at 600–01 (“In truth procedure of courts is something that belongs to the courts rather than to the legislature, whether we look at
the subject analytically or historically. It is a misfortune that the courts ever gave it
up.”).
123. Id. at 60. See also Goldberg, supra note 120, at 668–70. But see Whitten,
supra note 54, at 53–54 (noting limitations on court power over procedure in the
Judiciary and Process Acts and explaining why history is not conclusive); Dan Byron Dobbs, Judicial Regulation of Procedure, 9 ARK. L. REV. 146, 147–49 (1954) (arguing that inherent judicial power over procedure limited historically to trivial
matters and subject to legislative override).
124. See Pound, supra note 12, at 601; Josiah Marvel, The Rule-Making Power of
the Courts, 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 55, 55–57 (1928).
125. John H. Wigmore, Editorial Note, All Legislative Rules For Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 277–78 (1928).
126. See Gertner, supra note 46, at 37–41 (listing state court assertions of inherent power); Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A
Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (1976) (surveying state
enabling statutes and state court assertions of inherent authority); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 5–6 (detailing state constitutional grants of rulemaking
power to high courts); cf. Joiner & Miller, supra, at 626 (concluding that Michigan
Supreme Court views inherent and express constitutional grants of powers over
procedure as two different sources of power).
127. Its only textual basis is that the term “judicial power” encompasses all
procedural rules. Originalists are free to debate its historical meaning, but no
court has concluded as such and a historical analysis is beyond the scope of this
Note.
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Clause.128 According to this view, Congress has the ability to control
how courts administer the substantive rights and laws it creates.129
Although Congress has some authority to regulate court procedure,
this absolutist stance is wrong because the text of the Judicial Power
Clause specifies that the Supreme Court and all inferior courts,
even though created by Congress, have judicial power.130 Thus, if
judicial power covers some or all procedural rulemaking powers,
then courts have a textual basis of rulemaking authority that Congress cannot strip away.
Courts have adopted neither of these two absolutist stances
and instead have used the phrase “inherent authority” in multiple
contexts.131 The term itself is, however, quite misleading because
“[n]either Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of
formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which
are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the constitution.”132 However, as will
be explained below, there is a textual basis for the assertion of such
inherent authority, suggesting that there is nothing inherent about
it.
The Third Circuit thoroughly described the history of assertions of inherent powers by federal courts in Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.133 The Eash court explained that the scope and definition
of inherent power is unclear because courts rarely assert it and thus
rarely explain it.134 Courts use it as a generic term for three differ128. See generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”:
the Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696, 714–19 (1998) (discussing Madisonian Compromise).
129. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 n.35
(1982) (“The interaction between the Legislative and Judicial Branches is at its
height where courts are adjudicating rights wholly of Congress’ creation. Thus
where Congress creates a substantive right, pursuant to one of its broad powers to
make laws, Congress may have something to say about the proper manner of adjudicating that right.”).
130. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”).
131. See Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority For Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 473–74 (1937).
132. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); see also Epstein v. State, 128
N.E. 353 (Ind. 1920) (“This court is a constitutional court, and as such receives its
essential and inherent powers, rights, and jurisdiction from the Constitution, and
not from the legislature, and it has power to prescribe rules for its own direct
government independent of legislative enactment.”).
133. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
134. Id.
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ent types of power.135 First, Congress’s creation of a lower federal
court immediately imbues it with Article III judicial power and authorizes courts to act in contradiction to legislative enactments:
This use of inherent power, which might be termed irreducible
inherent authority, encompasses an extremely narrow range of
authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a
court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial power.’136
Although the boundaries of this power are unclear, the Court
listed several examples, including control over the structure of
court opinions, control over the docket, control over the implementation of a judgment, and the disqualification of judges.137
The second type of inherent power is described as being either
“implied from strict functional necessity” or “essential to the administration of justice.”138 The most common form of this power is the
power to issue a contempt sanction.139 Because it arises from necessity, even though it may be subject to congressional regulation,
Congress can neither eliminate it nor render it inoperative.140
The third form of inherent power is the ability of a court to
equip itself with certain tools to adjudicate cases.141 Because these
tools are useful but not necessary, the power exists only in the absence of contrary legislation.142 Examples of this power include the
ability to appoint an auditor, to certify issues of state law to state
courts, to grant bail in a situation not covered by statute, to dismiss
a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and a general
power to dismiss cases.143 The court distinguished rules formed
under inherent power from local rules and upheld the constitutionality of inherent powers.144
135. Id. at 561–62 (3d. Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 562.
137. Id. at 562 n.7 (citing multiple state court cases).
138. Id. at 562-63; see also Dobbs, supra note 123, at 148–150 (arguing that
inherent power includes what is necessary to administer courts).
139. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
140. Id.
141. The court noted that this power may stem from the equity powers of
chancery courts. Id. at 563–64.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 564.
144. The court reached this conclusion despite counter-arguments referencing Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and the rarity of federal common law. Eash, 757 F.2d at 566, 568–69.
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A careful review of case law proves that federal courts have
never denied the existence of inherent authority: “That the Federal
courts have power, or may be empowered, to make rules of procedure
for the conduct of litigation has been settled for a century.”145 The
number of assertions of inherent power by federal courts led one
scholar to note the following: “The only fair question is not whether
inherent power exists at all, but rather, what is the scope of such
power?”146 Nonetheless, neither all assertions of inherent power,
nor all the categories listed by the Eash court, survives a separation
of powers analysis. This Note considers each of these three categories to determine if any have textual or precedential backing.
D. Inherent Power to Ensure the Fair and Accurate
Adjudication of Cases
Though the theory of separation of powers stems from three
constitutional clauses, including the Judicial Power Clause, neither
courts nor scholars have articulated extensively the meaning and
scope of the phrase “judicial power.” Yet, if under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the legislature writes the laws, the executive
enforces the laws, and the judiciary applies the laws, then the Judicial Power Clause must include the power to adjudicate cases fairly
and constitutionally.147 If the judiciary cannot fairly and constitutionally apply the law, it cannot fulfill its function.
Because some procedural rules are necessary to adjudicate
cases, the first form of inherent power is the power to make rules
essential to the application of laws.148 This power is “implied from
strict functional necessity” and is “essential to the administration of
justice.”149 This Note contends that the adjudicatory power at the
145. 30 F.R.D. 73, 101 (1962) (emphasis added).
146. Joiner & Miller, supra note 126, at 626.
147. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (“Judicial
power . . . is the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it
into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.”);
State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 727–28 (Conn. 1974) (finding that core of judicial power is rendering judgment); Lawson, supra note 99, at 202–03 (noting that
Founders did not give “judicial power” much debate, but that such power includes
“the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law”).
148. This power is analogous to corporation law’s agency theory. The principal (Congress) has given its agent (federal courts) a duty (to adjudicate cases
under the laws provided). The principal empowered the courts, as agents, to take
all necessary steps to accomplish the duty until the principal changes or retracts
the duty or specifies how to accomplish said duty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AGENCY § 2.02 (2006) (defining agent’s authority).
149. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562–63; see also Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1320–21 (noting that inherent powers include those necessary to administer justice); cf. United
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heart of the Judicial Power Clause grants an inherent power to create rules necessary for the fair and constitutional adjudication of
cases.
The Supreme Court’s first official act was procedural, not substantive in nature: it created its seal and established requirements
for attorneys who could appear before it.150 Without such power,
the Court could not decide cases as no one could argue before it.
But the Court still had a long way to go; the absence of other necessary procedural rules prohibited adjudication. Basic court procedure like the submission of briefs and the procedure for oral
argument remained unspecified. Thus, in Hayburn’s Case,151 the
Court concluded by declaring that “[The Court] considers the practice of the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery of England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court . . . .”152 These two
examples, setting standards for attorneys arguing before the Court
and adopting English procedure, demonstrate the necessity of procedure to adjudication.
Eventually, Congress delegated statutory authority to the Supreme Court, and later to all federal courts, to create their own
procedure,153 but the absence of pre-existing procedural rules continued to plague courts. For example, a court cannot apply the law
to the facts if there is no reliable evidence to establish the facts.154
Therefore, before the advent of codified federal evidentiary rules, if
state rules did not apply then federal courts developed federal common law rules of evidence. In Funk v. United States,155 the Court
held that it and the other federal courts could articulate current
common law rules on spousal testimony in the absence of congressional legislation.156 Later, in McNabb v. United States,157 the Court
held a criminal confession inadmissible because of a court’s inherent power over the creation and maintenance of “civilized stanStates v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314 (1936) (discussing inherent executive power).
150. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 399 (1790).
151. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
152. Id. at 413–14.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988).
154. But see Charles Anthony Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rulemaking Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 601, 602 (1940) (arguing that
evidence rules are non-essential to constitutional function of legislature and
judiciary).
155. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
156. Id. at 381–83. See Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 380,
384–85, 391 (1826) (upholding court-made evidence rule that did not conflict
with statute).
157. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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dards of procedure and evidence.”158 Thus, despite the absence of a
constitutional requirement or any controlling federal statute, the
Court developed its own federal rules of evidence.159
Even after the enactment of codified rules of procedure, the
Court continued to fill in voids in the rules. It recognized the inherent power of courts to create procedural rules, writing that
“[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution.”160 Such powers include
the powers to fine for contempt or to imprison to preserve courtroom order, both of which “are powers which cannot be dispensed
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others . . . .”161 Later, the Court re-emphasized that the power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts because it is “essential
to the administration of justice” that courts be able to vindicate
their own authority without complete dependence on other
branches.162 Without it, “what the Constitution now fittingly calls
‘the judicial power of the United States’ would be a mere mockery.”163 Similarly, expanding the concept of “order” in Link v. Wabash Railway Co.,164 the Court held that
[t]he authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an “inherent power,”
governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.165
158. Id. at 340–41.
159. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 324, 370, 374–76, 379, 387 (2006) (noting Supreme Court rulings
filling evidentiary gaps by appealing to common law).
160. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
161. Id.
162. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795–96
(1987) (quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M., & O. Ry.
Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924)).
163. Id. at 796 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450
(1911)); see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 132 n.12 (1991) (acknowledging
inherent power), aff’d 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989); cf. Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 721–24 (1980) (recognizing
state supreme court’s inherent and statutory authority to discipline attorneys and
prescribe code of ethics).
164. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
165. Id. at 630–31. Similarly, in United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d
Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit upheld the use of inherent power to create a local
rule allowing dismissal with prejudice for inexcusable delay by the prosecution. See
Frank H. Gibbes, III, Note, The Judiciary and the Rule-Making Power, 23 S.C. L. REV.
377, 386-87 (1971) (citing holdings that establish court power to control order of
business as necessary to enforce rights and redress wrongs).
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Thus, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized an inherent
power to create rules necessary for the adjudication of cases.
But the above examples are all conditioned on the absence of
an already existing governing rule or law. Illustrating this limitation
is the case of Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,166 in
which the Court held that without congressional authorization, federal courts cannot create an exception to the general rule barring
attorney’s fees.167 In dicta, the Court explicitly referenced the inherent power to assess attorney’s fees for some instances of willful
disobedience or bad faith.168 But Congress had issued exceptions to
the general prohibition in statutes inapplicable to the case.169 As a
result of these exceptions, the Court concluded that to expand the
exceptions would conflict with the congressional policy to carve out
only limited exceptions.170 This ruling limited a federal court’s inherent power to issue fees to circumstances in which Congress has
not established a policy.171 In sum, there is an inherent power to
create procedural rules if 1) the rule is necessary to adjudication
and 2) Congress, or a body delegated authority by Congress, has
not provided a governing principle.
E. Inherent Power to Protect the Independence and Integrity
of the Judiciary
The Supreme Court has expounded the importance of an independent judiciary: “[O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial Power of the
United States’ must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It
commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously
guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that in166. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
167. Id. at 269.
168. Id. at 259–60.
169. Id. at 259.
170. Id. at 269.
171. Similarly, in Societe Internationale Pour Participants Indusrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), the Court rejected claims of its inherent power
to dismiss for noncompliance with a discovery order because a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure controlled. Id. at 207. See Shane v. McNeil, 41 N.W. 166, 168 (Iowa
1889) (finding that legislature enabled judicial conference to make laws; but noting that if conference fails to act, each court has common law power to make rules
that do not conflict with laws or conference’s rules); Mills v. Bank of United States,
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 431, 439–40 (1826) (upholding local rule designed to further
justice and save costs in part because rule did not interfere with any rules of
evidence).
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dependence.”172 When procedural rules infringe on the independence of the judiciary, courts can assert an inherent power to
protect their independence.173 There are two constitutional bases
for this inherent power. The first is that congressionally-created
rules infringing on judicial independence are never “necessary and
proper” to the “creation of inferior courts” and thus are always beyond legislative authority.174 The second is that the fair administration of justice and fair adjudication of cases is at the core of the
Judicial Power Clause and guarantees an independent judiciary
such that all other constitutional clauses must be read to accord
with this proposition.175 Federal courts have referenced the historical use of their inherent power176 but have never identified its constitutional source. Although the congressional authority theory is
equally plausible, this Note will focus on the judicial independence
theory because of its strong support in precedent.
Although rare, federal courts have sometimes asserted inherent authority on the grounds of judicial independence.177 Congress
may establish general laws, but not laws tailored specifically against
172. N. Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
58–60 (1982) (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980)).
173. In the words of the Eash court, it “might be termed irreducible inherent
authority, [and] encompasses an extremely narrow range of authority involving
activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to
divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial power.’ ” Eash v. Riggins Trucking,
Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Lawson, supra note 99, at 205–07,
210–11 (stressing importance of independence, and arguing that judicial power
includes power to reason to outcome of case); Robert J. Pushaw, The Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 824 (2001)
(“The Constitution does not prohibit all implied powers, however. Rather, the presumption against their existence can be rebutted by a showing that a certain power
must be inferred because otherwise a department would be unable to perform its
express constitutional functions.”); cf. Carter v. Commonwealth, 32 S.E. 780, 785
(Va. 1899) (“That in the courts created by the [Virginia State] Constitution there
is an inherent power of self-defense and self-preservation; that this power may be
regulated, but cannot be destroyed, or so far diminished as to be rendered ineffectual, by legislative enactment; that it is a power necessarily resident in, and to be
exercised by the court itself.”).
174. Lawson, supra note 99, at 192, 198–200; see also Pushaw, supra note 173,
at 742.
175. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848
(1986) (stating that Article III Section 1 protects judiciary from other branches
and protects litigant rights); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 368 (1978) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (stating that judicial independence benefits litigants).
176. For examples of such cases, see the Eash court’s case citations infra Part
II.F.
177. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146–47 (1871).
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individuals or classes of individuals.178 For example, the Court held
that Congress cannot declare a rule of decision in a specific case
because then “Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power.”179 A “rule of decision” renders the judicial process a mere formality. As Dean Pound
wrote, “None of the coordinate and co-equal departments of our
polity can do its work effectively if the minute details of its procedural operations, as distinct from the substantive law it applies or administers, are dictated by some other department.”180 Courts
adjudicate cases, and a rule of decision would prohibit any adjudicatory process, thereby stripping courts of their independence.181
The case of Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez 182 exemplifies how a
court would determine whether a law infringed on its independence. In Velazquez, the Court struck down a federal law providing
funds to attorneys of indigent clients on the condition that the attorneys not contest the validity of any statute.183 Although deciding
the case on First Amendment grounds, the decision’s reasoning
rings of separation of powers logic. The Court wrote that “[t]he
restriction distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of
the attorneys,”184 and in so doing,
the statute here threatens severe impairment of the judicial
function . . . . The courts and the public would come to question the adequacy and fairness of professional representations
when the attorney, either consciously to comply with this statute or unconsciously to continue the representation despite
the statute, avoided all reference to questions of statutory validity and constitutional authority. A scheme so inconsistent with
accepted separation-of-powers principles is an insufficient basis
to sustain or uphold the restriction on speech.185
Here the separation of powers concern is judicial review. Depriving advocates of valid constitutional arguments strips courts of
their check on the legislature. More broadly, any restrictions on
178. Lawson, supra note 99, at 201.
179. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146–47.
180. Pound, supra note 12, at 601 (1926).
181. See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A
Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 673–75 (1998) (explaining
that mechanical application of laws and procedure is not check on legislature).
182. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
183. Id. at 536–37.
184. Id. at 544.
185. Id. at 546. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248,
259 (7th Cir. 1975) (striking local rules regulating attorney extrajudicial comments
on First Amendment grounds and noting potential impact on fair trials).
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making valid legal arguments undermines the adversarial process,
thereby prohibiting courts from deciding cases accurately and
completely.
Use of this inherent power prompts a serious concern, justifying an assertion of inherent power with an argument based on independence carries grave consequences. In such cases, courts are
not filling voids, but rather are voiding congressional laws and establishing exclusive control over a field. Only a constitutional
amendment could overturn such a decision. Compounding this
concern are the unclear boundaries of this inherent power. Hence,
there is a concern that federal courts could assume too much
power, with little chance of legislative recourse. As a result, federal
courts have been reluctant to make such assertions.186
In contrast, state courts have been active in asserting such inherent authority. Although most state constitutions have explicit
separation of powers clauses,187 and despite potential conflicts with
substantive policies, many courts have protected their control of
these arenas as necessary to their independence.188 Among the areas state courts have held to be within the exclusive regulation of
the judiciary and beyond legislative control are: aspects of pleadings,189 control of the docket,190 the structure of court opinions,191
186. For some examples, see infra note 261. See Silas A. Harris, The Extent and
Use of Rule-Making Authority, 22 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 27, 29 (1938); Pushaw, supra note
173, at 738. For a discussion about concerns with rules made by courts because of
the difficulty in changing them see Warach, supra note 76, at 386; Allan Ashman,
Measuring the Judicial Rule-Making Power, 59 JUDICATURE 215, 218 (1975) (noting
that Supreme Court rarely uses rulemaking power unless clear statutory or inherent power); W. Glenn Forrester, Note, Substance and Procedure: The Scope of Judicial
Rule Making Authority in Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 364, 384 (1976); Gertner, supra note
46, at 44 (noting that courts are reluctant to make rules unless they are certain
such rules are within their power).
187. Gertner, supra note 46, at 5–6 (detailing state constitutional grants of
rulemaking power to high courts).
188. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 18–23, 30–36.
189. Epstein v. State, 128 N.E. 353, 353 (Ind. 1920) (striking law conflicting
with court rule requiring concise statement in pleadings); White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d
102, 103, 107 (Wyo. 1984) (striking law regulating ad damnum clauses as infringing on court constitutional and inherent authority to control pleadings).
190. Atchinson v. Long, 251 P. 486, 489 (Okla. 1926) (recognizing legislature’s power to control procedure but striking law prioritizing certain cases because of court’s inherent authority to control court business, without which court
would become “impotent and useless”).
191. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25–28 (1859) (striking law requiring
courts to issue written opinions), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 14 (requiring California Supreme Court and appellate courts to write
down reasons and causes).
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the space allocation within courthouses,192 control of courthouse
facilities,193 control over courthouse personnel,194 the method of
impaneling jurors,195 correcting judgments based on fraud,196 control of discovery,197 the fixing of bail and release from custody,198
dismissing a case when a party failed to appear,199 control over certiorari petitions,200 and jury instructions.201 These state court decisions provide a sense of the potentially large scope of this
unchecked inherent power.202
The scope and use of this power depends on several factors,
including (1) encroachments on the Article I legislative power of
Congress; (2) the historical use and meaning of inherent power;203
192. Dahnke v. People, 48 N.E. 137, 139–141 (Ill. 1897) (recognizing inherent power to control space inside courtroom when county board ordered janitor to
lock judge out of courtroom).
193. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vigo County v. Stout, 35 N.E. 683, 685–86 (Ind. 1893)
(asserting constitutional and inherent authority over controlling elevators in courthouse as necessary to dignity, decorum, and convenience).
194. See In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 36 Wis. 410, 410 (1874) (claiming
constitutional and inherent authority to appoint janitors because they are necessary to administer justice and judges develop bonds of trust with them).
195. People v. Brown, 212 N.W. 968, 969 (Mich. 1927) (upholding process of
choosing jurors by pulling names from box).
196. See In re McDonald, 164 N.E. 261, 263 (Ind. 1928) (per curiam) (finding
inherent power to vacate judgment based on fraud).
197. State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974).
198. State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (Wash. 1974) (striking law conflicting
with court rule regulating the setting of bail and finding that court’s power is inherent and incidental from power to hold defendant).
199. Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715–16 (Ill. 1952) (affirming
dismissal for failure to appear despite law requiring party receive notice five days
before dismissal).
200. Fischer v. Bedminster, 76 A.2d 673, 676 (N.J. 1950) (noting that state
supreme court has exclusive power to decide certiorari petitions because if legislature could regulate them, then it could make some of its acts beyond judicial
review).
201. Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975) (finding that judge has
discretion about manner of presenting jury instructions, and noting that legislature can make rules as long as they coincide with fair and efficient administration
of justice).
202. Scholars have speculated on other realms potentially within such inherent power, like administrative matters—such as a court’s docket and record keeping—as well as arenas crucial to accurate fact-finding and judgments, like
compelling testimony and appointing experts. Whitten, supra note 54, at 56;
Pushaw, supra note 173, at 742.
203. See, e.g., Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 644 (1960) (finding that history
did not support use of inherent power to partake in type of discovery at issue); see
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (Supreme Court’s function in
promulgating procedural rules is central element of historically acknowledged mis-
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(3) the practical impact on judicial independence and the ability to
adjudicate cases accurately and constitutionally; and (4) a preference to exert inherent power as a last resort because federal courts
are not accountable democratically and because of the difficulty for
Congress to overturn the decision. The most difficult cases are
likely to arise when congressional action to improve the integrity of
the judicial branch conflicts with court tradition, such as if Congress passed a law prohibiting judges from dissenting without opinion, or if Congress required appellate courts to count the votes of
each judge on an issue-by-issue basis instead of by each judge’s view
of the outcome of the case.204
F. There is No Inherent Power to Create Useful or Beneficial Laws that
are Not Necessary to Adjudication or Independence
The Eash Court observed a third form of inherent power: the
power of a court to equip itself with useful but not necessary tools
in the absence of contrary legislation.205 Examples of this power
included the ability to appoint an auditor,206 certify issues to state
courts,207 grant bail in a situation not covered by statute,208 dismiss
a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,209 and a general
sion of Judicial Branch). “The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted
safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they
were when the instrument was framed and adopted.” Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 108–09 (1925); see also Pound, supra note 12, at 601 (advocating looking to
colonial and English history to clarify powers of branches of government).
204. To illustrate, consider the following example: a criminal defendant claim
seeks a new trial, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Four
Justices conclude that neither amendment was violated and accordingly deny the
request for a new trial. Three Justices conclude that both amendments were violated and would order a new trial. One Justice concludes that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation but no Fifth Amendment violation and would thus order a
new trial. The final Justice concludes that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, but that there was a Fifth Amendment violation and accordingly would order
a new trial. If the Court counted its votes by each Justice’s view of the ultimate
outcome of the case, then the defendant would receive a new trial, as five Justices
reached that conclusion. However, if the court counted its votes by issue, then the
prosecution would win because on each issue five Justices concluded there was no
violation. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11–17 (1993) (illustrating the different
impacts that counting votes by issue as opposed to by outcome can have on a
litigant).
205. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563–64 (3d. Cir. 1985).
206. Id. at 563 (citing Supreme Court and circuit court decisions).
207. Id. at 564.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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power to dismiss cases.210 Although courts have asserted such inherent power, doing so is a breach of the separation of powers. Such
power is limitless so long as there are no contrary federal laws and
Congress has not preempted that field of procedure. More importantly, there is no constitutional basis for assertions of such authority. Still, one could argue that rules made under this justification,
like forum non conveniens, are necessary to the fair adjudication of a
case or that there is statutory authority for courts to make these
rules, such as the general rulemaking power established by
§ 2071(a) or via federal rules, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83.211
III.
DELEGATION OF POWER
A. Introduction
The non-delegation doctrine restricts Congress’s power to
delegate authority to other bodies.212 On the whole the non-delegation doctrine raises three issues regarding federal rulemaking powers. First, the delegated power should be strictly and exclusively
legislative in nature.213 Second, the delegation of power should be
accompanied by an intelligible principle to guide the body receiving such authority.214 Third, the assertion of such authority cannot
cause an exertion of nonjudicial powers by the courts that would
violate the Judicial Power Clause or the Case or Controversy
Clause.215
210. Id.
211. When there is no controlling law or procedure, “A judge may regulate
practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).
212. See Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 701–02 (2006).
213. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (noting that delegation of power to Sentencing Commission is unconstitutional only if “Congress
has vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately performed by
the other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary”).
214. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle,’ and the agency must follow it.”) (citation omitted).
215. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1988) (“ ‘[E]xecutive and administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding
office under Art. III of the Constitution.’ The purpose of this limitation is to help
ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent the Judiciary from
encroaching into areas reserved for the other branches.”) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)) (citations omitted); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 352 (1911) (“That neither the legislative nor the executive branches can
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Federal courts will likely reject challenges to the rulemaking
process made under the non-delegation doctrine.216 Dicta from
Mistretta largely forecloses these claims.217 In Mistretta, the Court
explained: “[W]e specifically have upheld . . . Congress’s power to
confer on the Judicial Branch the rulemaking authority contemplated in the various enabling Acts.”218 Indeed, Supreme Court precedent has continually upheld such delegation throughout the
nation’s history.219 Although the Court’s language supports the
conclusion that the REA would survive a non-delegation challenge,
the topic deserves a more intricate analysis.
B. Non-Delegation Doctrine Analysis
The first issue introduced by the REA is whether Congress delegated uniquely legislative, as opposed to judicial, power to the
courts. If uniquely legislative, then the non-delegation doctrine may
have been violated because “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted
[by the Constitution] shall be vested in a Congress.”220 The Mistretta
constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as are properly judicial,
and to be performed in a judicial manner.”).
216. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 375 (noting that Court has only struck down two
cases under non-delegation doctrine.).
217. Notably, Mistretta is persuasive evidence of how the Court would decide a
challenge to the rulemaking process on the basis of the non-delegation doctrine.
But Mistretta concerned the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing commission, thus all references to rulemaking are dicta.
218. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388 (referencing REA and Court’s decision in Sibbach); see also id. at 386–87 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) and
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).
219. See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 20, 22–23; Bank of the United States
v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61–62 (1825) (“Congress might regulate the
whole practice of the Courts, if it was deemed expedient so to do but this power is
vested in the Courts; and it never has occurred to any one that it was a delegation
of legislative power . . . Partakes no more of legislative power, than that discretionary authority entrusted to every department of the government in a variety of
cases.”). But see WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 3–4 (“Court rules have much the form
and effect of legislative enactment. Until repealed or modified they control all
litigation encompassed within their ambit. Like legislative enactments, they are
subject to interpretation and to a declaration of invalidity when they are in conflict
with legislation or constitutions.”).
220. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the
statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests ‘all legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United
States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers . . . .”). But see FCC v. Fox
TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1826 n.2 (2009) (“[T]he Framers vested ‘All
legislative Powers’ in the Congress, Art. I, § 1, just as in Article II they vested the
‘executive Power’ in the President, Art. II, § 1. Those provisions do not purport to
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Court described rulemaking as being neither inherently legislative
nor judicial; instead, adopting a functionalist perspective stressing
cooperation between the branches, the Court described it as being
in a “twilight area” because it is either nonjudicial or not a function
exclusively committed to another branch.221 This description suggests it is not a delegation of uniquely legislative power.222
The second issue is whether the acts enabling the rulemaking
process have an intelligible principle to guide the judiciary.223 All
the authorizing procedural statutes at issue contain directives. For
example, the REA’s delegation of power to the Supreme Court is to
“prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” that “shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”224 Likewise, all of
the entities that aid the Court in developing the rules have clear
legislative mandates. Congress charged the Judicial Conference
with promoting uniformity, expedience, “simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and
the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,” as well as ensuring the federal rules are consistent with federal law.225 Congress
directed the Judicial Conference’s standing committees to change
and develop rules “necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise
promote the interest of justice.”226 In reaching its decision, the Mistretta Court cited the language of the delegations to the Judicial
Conference and its committees.227 This dicta, combined with the
limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others.”)
(citation omitted).
221. “That judicial rulemaking, at least with respect to some subjects, falls
within this twilight area is no longer an issue for dispute. None of our cases indicate that rulemaking per se is a function that may not be performed by an entity
within the Judicial Branch, either because rulemaking is inherently nonjudicial or
because it is a function exclusively committed to the Executive Branch.” Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 386–87, 407–08.
222. See id. This holding may be weaker in the context of rulemaking for
bankruptcy cases because Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the authority to
make “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy.” But the courts could likely limit
this phrase to substantive powers thereby not restricting the current delegation of
rulemaking powers.
223. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (citing J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). For examples of impermissible delegations of
power, see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b) (1990).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1994).
227. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388–89 (citing Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398
U.S. 74, 86, n. 7 (1970) (“Though not the subject of constitutional challenge, by
established practice we have recognized Congress’ power to create the Judicial
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instructions contained in each statute, suggests there is an intelligible principle in each of the enabling acts.
The final contention concerns the Judicial Power and Case or
Controversy Clauses.228 The Mistretta Court explained that while, as
a general rule, Congress cannot require Article III judges to execute nonjudicial and administrative duties, there are significant exceptions.229 Elaborating, the Court said, “[C]onsistent with the
separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch
nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.”230 Under this test the Court suggested it
would uphold the statutes authorizing the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the rules advisory committees, and other
rulemaking and administrative entities.231
The Court conceded that these rulemaking bodies made political decisions with substantive implications and authored standards
of general application divorced from individual fact scenarios.232
Acknowledging that the Judicial Conference does not decide issues
that arise within either a case or controversy, the Court observed
that it contributes to the fair and efficient adjudication of cases.
The Court has never disavowed the delegation of such nonjudicial
power.233 For example, federal courts have accepted the powers to
Conference of the United States, the Rules Advisory Committees that it oversees . . . .”)). Most scholars agree with the Court on this point. See, e.g., Moore,
supra note 35, at 1047. But see Yeazell, supra note 12, at 243–44 (suggesting that
because judges make and interpret rules proscribed via the REA, it suffers from
same concerns present in Schecter Poultry and Panama Refining).
228. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361–62 (“According to express provision of Article
III, the judicial power of the United States is limited to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ . . . These doctrines help to ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch
by precluding debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political Branches, and prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for
the other Branches by extending judicial power to matters beyond those disputes
‘traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.’ As
a general principle, we stated as recently as last Term that ‘executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office
under Art. III of the Constitution.’ ”) (citations omitted).
229. Id. at 385–86; see Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1317; Alfange, supra note
181, at 674–81.
230. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388.
231. Id. at 388–89 (citing Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86, n.7
(1970)).
232. Id. at 392.
233. Id. at 389–90 (“ ‘These entities, some of which are comprised of judges,
others of judges and nonjudges, still others of nonjudges only, do not exercise
judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies, but
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oversee the administrative and personnel matters of courts, study
judicial administration, make appointments, supervise grand juries,
and review search warrant and wiretap applications.234 Thus, the
judiciary’s acceptance of nonjudicial powers lays a strong foundation in defense of the rulemaking delegation despite the text of
Article III.
Additional reasoning in Mistretta, however, suggests there may
not be a clear answer. The Court distinguished the delegation of
power to the Sentencing Commission on the grounds that the Commission was not a court and that it was accountable to Congress,
which could revoke or amend all of its decisions.235 Furthermore,
the Court treated it as an independent agency, despite having some
federal judges as members, because it was controlled in part by the
President—who determined membership—and because its
rulemaking had a notice and comment procedure per the Administrative Procedure Act.236
In contrast, the federal rulemaking process does not share
these features. A court, the Supreme Court, creates procedural
rules. Congress did not delegate the Judicial Conference power to
make rules as it did with the Sentencing Commission to make
guidelines. Rather, it delegated to the Conference the power to research and propose rules, but the Supreme Court has the power to
“promulgate” the rules. Also, although Congress can amend or
withdraw the power of the Court to create rules under the REA, it is
unclear whether Congress can override a federal rule of procedure
by statute.237 Furthermore, the Supreme Court is part of the judithey share the common purpose of providing for the fair and efficient fulfillment
of responsibilities that are properly the province of the Judiciary. Thus, although
the judicial power of the United States is limited by express provision of Article III
to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ we have never held, and have clearly disavowed in
practice, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that, in
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, are “necessary and proper . . . for carrying into
execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce.”’ Because of their close relation to the central mission of the Judicial
Branch, such extrajudicial activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch
and are not more appropriate for another Branch.”) (internal citations omitted).
234. Id. at 390–92 & n.16; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 142 (noting
that “strict separation of powers has really never existed in its country; it is one of
the strengths of our pragmatic system that there is a certain leakage from one
branch to the other that seems to lubricate the entire system”).
235. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393–94.
236. Id.
237. For example, Congress withdrew from the Supreme Court the power to
create rules concerning evidentiary privileges. But if Congress passed a law con-
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cial branch, has membership composed entirely of federal judges, is
appointed by the President with heavily restricted removal power
vested in the Senate, and has no notice and comment
requirements.238
These facts, however, do not raise red flags because, although
the Supreme Court promulgates the rules, the federal system entertains a fiction that it is not the Supreme Court, in an Article III
sense, making these rules. As elaborated below, the Mistretta Court
held that the federal judges on the Sentencing Commission acted
in a purely administrative non-Article III capacity.239 Similarly, in
the rulemaking process, the Justices act as part of an independent
agency within the judicial branch but outside the bounds of the
Supreme Court and their status as Justices. This fiction allows parties to contest the validity of the rules, avoids the prohibition on
advisory opinions, and allows the Justices and members of the Judicial Conference to later rule on these issues impartially.240
A related issue is the Chief Justice’s influence over the Judicial
Conference in the drafting process. Congress outlined most of the
membership requirements for the Conference, but the text is silent
on the selection of practitioners and academics for the committees
of the Judicial Conference.241 Traditionally, the Chief Justice, as
chair of the Conference, appointed them.242 This structure caused
concern that the Chief Justice could disproportionately influence
the policy decisions of the Conference and the future of the federal
rules.243 Further, because the Conference knows the Supreme
flicting with a current federal rule of procedure, the supersession clause could be
construed to invalidate the rule. See infra Part IV.B (discussing supersession
clause).
238. The current federal rulemaking structure closely parallels the notice and
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, although there is no
statutory compulsion to do so. Whether this is a requirement under the non-delegation doctrine or the Due Process Clause has never been decided. See U.S. Courts
website, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Over
view.aspx (describing notice and comment process); cf. Bone, supra note 21, at 908
(comparing judicial rulemaking to administrative rulemaking and to Sentencing
Commission).
239. Supra notes 245–47; see Garvito, supra note 86, at 1078–79 (noting that
judicial conference is not a strictly judicial organ and does not sit as a court).
240. See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008).
242. See U.S. Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited January 17, 2011); BROWN, supra note 29, at
13–15.
243. Former committee reporter Judge Weinstein remarked that “it was a disquieting moment” when the Chief Justice commanded the committee to defend
an old version of a rule despite the committee’s support of a proposed Congres-
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Court must approve the rules, it may cater its proposals to a majority of the Court.244 However, viewing the entire process as an independent agency with multiple subcommittees obviates any
delegation problems with the head of an agency (the Supreme
Court) having some control over the lower echelon. Indeed, the
heads of all administrative agencies exert at least some control over
the hiring of their employees. Moreover, as an agency designed by
Congress, the Conference is free to establish its own hierarchy and
procedures. One would expect the head of an agency to direct his
employees and serve as the final evaluator of their work.
Mistretta further distinguished the Sentencing Commission
from Article III courts in that the Commission’s technical placement in the judiciary did not increase the branch’s authority.245
The Court noted that prior to the passage of the act, courts had the
power to decide sentences; also, Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its own authority or diminish its or the executive
branch’s power.246 In a footnote, the Court noted that the “constitutional calculus” is different for considering non-judicial activities
delegated to courts, in part because of the constitutionally required
autonomy of courts.247
This same reasoning supports the delegation of rulemaking authority to the judiciary. The federal judiciary’s rulemaking power
has existed for two hundred years and Congress retains, and has
periodically asserted, the power to modify such grants of authority.248 Further, the undefined “constitutional calculus” does not apply to the Supreme Court under the theory that it acts as part of an
independent agency.249 Moreover, even if a more rigid calculus did
sional amendment. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 102; see Alan B. Morrison & D.
Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: More Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 CONST. COMM. 57, 65 (1994) (noting that publications of academics
allow Chief Justice to choose ones that will advance his/her desired policies).
244. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 8–9 (expressing concern that Chief Justice
will not select ideologically diverse group).
245. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 395–97 (1989).
246. Notably, Congress could repeal the act creating the Sentencing Commission and the Executive never had the powers given to the Commission. Id.
247. Id. at 394 n.20.
248. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 57–74; Edgard Bronson Tolman, Historical
Beginnings of Procedural Reform Movement in This Country—Principles to be Observed in
Making Rules, 22 A.B.A. J. 783, 785–86 (1936); Edson R. Sunderland, Implementing
the Rule-Making Power, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27, 29–32 (1950).
249. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 394 (“[B]ecause Congress vested the power to
promulgate sentencing guidelines in an independent agency, not a court, there
can be no serious argument that Congress combined legislative and judicial power
within the Judicial Branch.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\66-3dr\NYS309.txt

632

unknown

Seq: 40

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

15-MAR-11

10:51

[Vol. 66:593

apply, Congress’s control over the scope and structure of the authority, the courts’ history in having such power, and the “twilight
zone” status of rulemaking suggests that the judiciary has not
gained power, nor has any other branch lost power, by the
delegation.
C. The Effect of the Delegation of Rulemaking Power on the Integrity of
the Judicial Branch
Although not a per se aspect of the non-delegation doctrine,
delegation can sometimes raise the issue of whether an act will undermine the integrity and independence of the judicial branch.
Both the delegation of sentencing power in Mistretta and the delegation of rulemaking authority present similar concerns on this
point. Decades of case law, history, and the Article III protections of
federal judges reinforce the importance of an independent federal
judiciary.250 Equally important is the legitimacy of the Judicial
Branch, which depends on public confidence and the appearance
of impartiality.251 The Mistretta opinion provides compelling support for the position that the current delegation of rulemaking
power does not threaten these essential characteristics.
Mistretta provides a solid foundation for upholding the role of
federal judges in the rulemaking process. As the Court concluded,
“The text of the Constitution contains no prohibition against the
service of active federal judges on independent commissions.”252
The Court also cited rejected proposals made at the Constitutional
Convention and during the first Congress, and a long history of
allowing Article III judges to assume extrajudicial responsibilities in
government; examples included federal judges serving as ambassadors, cabinet members, and members of executive and cultural
commissions.253 Crucially, the Court labeled such roles “extrajudicial service,” establishing clearly that while in these roles federal
judges were not acting pursuant to Article III authority but rather
250. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 480 U.S. 50, 59–60
(1982).
251. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407–08 (noting that “legitimacy of the Judicial
Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and
nonpartisanship”).
252. Id. at 397.
253. Id. at 398–404. See Morrison & Stenhouse, supra note 243, at 57–68 (detailing nonjudicial powers of Chief Justice of the United States, including control
over federal court procedure, appointment power, and participation in legislative
process).
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in an administrative capacity.254 Viewing the actions of the Supreme
Court and the judges on the Judicial Conference as administrative
in nature, the rulemaking process is consistent with this reasoning.
However, not every kind of extrajudicial service necessarily accords with the Constitution; the test remains whether it undermines
the integrity of the judicial branch.255 Accordingly, the Mistretta
Court evaluated claims that judicial involvement with the Sentencing Commission threatened the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judicial branch as a whole.256 The petitioners cited
the required service by at least three federal judges, but the Court
rejected the argument because each judge presumably consented
to appointment by the President.257 The Court also noted that service on the Commission did not prevent federal judges from fulfilling their Article III duties, nor did it result in substantial numbers
of recusals that hindered the judicial branch, because federal
courts are free to assess the validity of federal procedural rules.258
In contrast, the REA requires chief judges, justices, and unspecified district court judges to sit on the Judicial Conference.259
Nonetheless, the Court cited these aspects of the rulemaking process approvingly, explaining that it has “given at least tacit approval
to this degree of congressionally mandated judicial service on
254. “The judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their
status and authority as Article III judges, but solely because of their appointment
by the President as the Act directs. Such power as these judges wield as Commissioners is not judicial power; it is administrative power derived from the enabling
legislation . . . In other words, the Constitution, at least as a per se matter, does not
forbid judges to wear two hats; it merely forbids them to wear both hats at the same
time.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404; accord Garvito, supra note 86, 1078–79 (noting that
judicial conference is not a strictly judicial organ and does not sit as a court).
255. “This is not to suggest, of course, that every kind of extrajudicial service
under every circumstance necessarily accords with the Constitution. That the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit a federal judge from assuming extrajudicial
duties does not mean that every extrajudicial service would be compatible with, or
appropriate to, continuing service on the bench; nor does it mean that Congress
may require a federal judge to assume extrajudicial duties as long as the judge is
assigned those duties in an individual, not judicial, capacity. The ultimate inquiry
remains whether a particular extrajudicial assignment undermines the integrity of
the Judicial Branch.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404.
256. “While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal,
no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that
may arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy. The legitimacy of the
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation.” Id. at 407.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 406–07.
259. Id. (citing REA).
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nonadjudicatory bodies.”260 Moreover, there is no indication that
service on the Judicial Conference leads to widespread recusals that
inhibit the judicial branch. Although the responsibility of reviewing
rule proposals could burden an overworked Supreme Court, the
few indications we have from the Justices suggest that rule proposals receive a cursory review.261 Barring a sworn statement by the
Justices, contentions that the Court’s role in the rulemaking process undermines its integrity are unlikely to receive much support
from the Court.
Lastly, the Mistretta Court exhibited concern with the potential
loss of public faith in the integrity of the branch as a whole given its
involvement in the Commission. Ultimately, however, the Court
concluded that there was no reputational loss, stressing the judicial
nature of the Commission’s function, the expertise of the judiciary,
the practical value of federal judges sitting on the Commission, and
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concept of reciprocity.262 The widespread support for the current rulemaking process mirrors these
same traits.263 The analogous structure and power of the Sentencing Commission and the discussion from Mistretta strongly suggest
that the federal rulemaking scheme undermines neither the independence nor the integrity of the Judicial Branch.
D. Proper Delegation But Improper Execution
Even if the delegation itself does not undermine judicial independence and integrity, some exercises of this delegated power
could do so. Although such an issue has never arisen concerning
rules passed under the REA, it has arisen in other contexts. For
example, internal circuit court rules prohibiting district court
judges from handling cases264 or permitting the investigation of alleged improper conduct by a judge265 have raised concerns about
their affect on judicial independence. These concerns would apply
260. Id. at 406 n.29 (citing Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970)).
261. See, e.g., 146 F.R.D. 401, 504–05 (1993); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance
and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 842
(1993); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1072 (1992).
262. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407–08.
263. See supra notes 68–75, 77.
264. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 130–38, 143 (1970) (Black,
J., dissenting) (concluding that rule undermined judicial independence by punishing and regulating idiosyncrasies of judges).
265. See In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505
(11th Cir. 1986) (upholding statute authorizing judicial council to investigate improper conduct by federal judge).
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with equal force to rules passed under the REA that have similar
effects. Thus, although the Court has found the process to be permissible, constitutional challenges to the implementation and execution of such power remain viable.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
THE PROCESS
Having defended the delegation, placement, and use of federal rulemaking power by federal courts, the only challenges that
remain are to specific statutory provisions. Two potential challenges
to the rulemaking process warrant discussion. The first is the constitutionality of Congress’s “legislative veto” over proposed federal
rules. The second is the validity of the supersession clause.
A. Is the “Legislative Veto” Valid?
One issue engendered by Congress’s role in promulgating federal rules is the constitutionality of its ability to invalidate proposals.
In I.N.S. v. Chadha,266 the Supreme Court invalidated legislative vetoes.267 At issue in Chadha was a statute authorizing either house of
Congress to overturn the Attorney General’s decision to suspend
the deportation of an illegal alien residing within the country.268
The practical advantages of the legislative veto could not stand in
light of the constitutionally imposed requirements of bicameralism
and presentment to pass a law.269
The REA is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Chadha.
Crucially, Congress’s role in the federal rulemaking process differs
from the legislative veto because if and when it acts, Congress does
so before the proposed rules take effect.270 Thus, Congress intervenes in the process of creating a rule and not in the application of
the rule; it is merely preventing a proposed rule from becoming
266. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
267. Id. at 959.
268. Id. at 924–25.
269. “Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does
not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained . . . . By the same token, the fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.” Id. at 944, 946, 947–48, 950–51.
270. The Supreme Court must submit each rule promulgated under this act’s
authority to Congress by May 1, and the rules may not take effect until at least
December 1 of the year submitted. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988). Absent congressional
action during this time period, the rule becomes law. U.S. Courts, http://www.
uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Overview.aspx.
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effective. Moreover, when Congress intervenes it often does so after
having satisfied the bicameralism and presentment requirements.
For example, when Congress disagreed with portions of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, it passed a law, approved by both
houses and signed by the President, to prevent the proposal from
taking effect.271 Later, having made modifications to the proposal,
Congress passed its version of the rules of evidence as a bill that
went through both houses and was signed by the President into
law.272 Similarly, when Congress amends pre-existing federal rules,
it does so by passing a law.273 Furthermore, the REA does not discuss a legislative veto. All it requires is that the Supreme Court
transmit the proposed rules to Congress by May 1 and that they
take effect no earlier than December 1 of that same year.274 This
provision can be understood as a simple notice requirement. Congress need not act nor be in session for the rules to take effect; the
required time interval does nothing more than give Congress time
to decide if it wishes to intervene in the rulemaking process of an
independent agency. In effect, Congress has decided that the affirmative action of one of its houses is enough to halt the rulemaking process of the agency it created.275 Congress ordering an
independent agency to stop its process does not seem to be a “law”
and thus does not require bicameralism and presentment.276
B. Is the Supersession Clause Valid?
The second constitutional issue concerning the process of
making the federal rules is the REA’s supersession clause, which
specifies that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”277 The
clause raises two potential constitutional issues. The first is whether
a rule can functionally nullify a law without violating the bicameralism and presentment requirements. The second issue is whether
271. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
272. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1976).
273. See, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983) (amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2074.
275. By analogy, there does not appear to be a constitutional barrier to Congress requiring the EPA to give it advanced notice of its proposed laws and allow
Congress the opportunity to reject them before they take effect. Congress created
these agencies and created their procedure.
276. Of course, any rejection of rules codifying the inherent powers of courts
would reject the codification but not the courts’ constitutional authority to exert
such inherent power.
277. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990).
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this would constitute a core legislative act that Congress cannot
delegate.
Case law on the supersession clause is rare and only partially
illuminating. The Sibbach Court held that Congress may delegate
rulemaking powers to the federal courts “to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States.”278
This phrase suggests that the supersession clause is invalid. But only
a few federal cases have ever considered the supersession clause,
and no court has held it invalid.279 In Jackson v. Stinnett,280 the Fifth
Circuit attempted to reconcile the clause with Chadha.281 The Court
explained that the clause has never been held to invalidate all conflicting federal statutes; rather, it only applies to statutes existing
before the rule’s passage and therefore does not apply to any subsequent statutes.282 In other words, the Jackson court held that because Congress passed the statute after the rule had been in effect,
the statute repealed the rule.283
The Jackson court’s emphasis on the retrospective, rather than
prospective, power of rules has some formalist support. Courts technically do not have the power to repeal laws. For example, when a
court holds a statute unconstitutional, the statute remains law; the
holding is a directive to courts to not enforce that law. Only Congress may act to withdraw the text of the law.284 For the same reason, when a district court holds a statute unconstitutional and the
circuit court reverses this decision, Congress need not re-pass the
statute because it never ceased to exist; the district court’s holding
prevented the application of the statute but never repealed it. This
278. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 3 (1941).
279. In the same year, the Second Circuit handled two such cases. In one it
held that a rule of appellate procedure regulating the taxable costs for brief filing
superseded a conflicting federal statute; the opinion was brief and decided the
issue solely upon the supersession clause without any discussion of the separation
of powers. See Albatross Tanker Corp. v. SS. Amoco Delaware, 418 F.2d 248, 248
(2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). The second case, in the same brief manner, held that
two rules of appellate procedure regulating the costs of printing briefs and docket
fees trumped conflicting federal statutes, again citing the supersession clause dispositively but with no discussion of its validity. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Cottons,
419 F.2d 372, 374 (2d Cir. 1969).
280. 102 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 1996).
281. Id. at 134 n.3.
282. Id. at 135 & n.3.
283. Id. at 136.
284. For example, after the Supreme Court declared Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional, the statute remained in the United
States Code until Congress repealed it shortly after the decision. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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logic supports the Jackson court’s reasoning because the supersession clause would only strip prior statutes of their force but would
not repeal them. Therefore, if a new rule conflicts with a pre-existing statute, that statute becomes ineffective but continues to exist. If that new rule is then repealed, the statute’s power is revived.
As the Jackson court concluded, this seems to circumvent Chadha
concerns because although the supersession clause may nullify a
statute’s effectiveness, it does not repeal it; thus, bicameralism and
presentment are not required.285
This logic, however, does not quell concerns that rendering a
statute functionally invalid, even if only temporarily, is a legislative
act that only Congress can perform. Some scholars argue that the
supersession clause means Congress made the decision that laws it
passes in the procedural realm are only temporary and that Congress has elected not to retain exclusive jurisdiction over that realm
of law.286 This may be so, but in the hierarchy of sources of law, laws
should trump rules because of their democratic origins. Further, in
Chadha, the Court noted that not all actions taken by the legislature
are legislative; one must examine the character and effects of the
action to determine if it is legislative in nature.287 Rendering a law
functionally void seems legislative in nature.
The only way to circumvent the Article I issue is to view the
supersession clause as a congressional instruction to courts on how
to handle a conflict between a law and a rule. Per the Jackson court,
the instruction is that chronology is dispositive. The degree to
which Congress can regulate how the judiciary interprets laws is a
question fraught with concerns about the separation of powers and
judicial independence. The lack of federal court discussion of the
supersession clause and the Judicial Conference’s reluctance to
pass rules conflicting with pre-existing laws suggests there is no
clear answer to the constitutional question of the supersession
clause’s validity.

285. But see Moore, supra note 35, 1051 (suggesting that clause violates
Chadha, noting failed amendment to REA attempting to repeal clause, and citing
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s statement that Judicial Conference will avoid producing
rules that conflict with laws); cf. Whitten, supra note 54, at 63–66 (noting that
scope of supersession clause may depend on level of Congressional action in procedural area at issue).
286. See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 54, at 61–62.
287. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\66-3dr\NYS309.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 47

15-MAR-11

DEFENSE OF FEDERAL RULEMAKING POWER

10:51

639

V.
CONCLUSION
This Note’s separation of powers analysis sheds light on several
relevant issues for courts and practitioners, and identifies the constitutional boundaries of federal court rulemaking power.
Although other bodies may do the actual drafting, according
to case law and the statutory language, the Supreme Court has the
power to create the federal rules. When exerting this rulemaking
power, the Court acts within the judicial branch. Despite the
Court’s reliance on statutory power to create procedural rules, federal courts possess two forms of inherent power to do so. Inherent
power exists because Congress cannot stop courts from performing
their constitutional function of adjudicating cases nor infringe on
their independence. If courts cannot remain independent and
fairly adjudicate cases, then their function as a co-equal branch of
government is compromised.
Nonetheless, the Court can constitutionally create rules under
its statutory authority. The REA does not violate the two requirements of the non-delegation doctrine: Congress did not delegate
legislative power, and it did provide an intelligible principle. Moreover, viewing the rulemaking process as occurring within an independent agency within the judicial branch rather than in the
federal courts’ Article III capacity alleviates constitutional concerns
about the powers of the judiciary. Further, the process does not
undermine the integrity of the judicial branch to an unconstitutional degree. Finally, this Note both justifies Congress’s role in the
process, by dispelling the perception that the REA confers a legislative veto, and provides a defense of the supersession clause. The
current federal procedural rulemaking process is largely defensible
under a formalist separation of powers analysis. The above analysis
outlines the proper steps to determine if future rules passed under,
or modifications made to, the process comply with the separation
of powers.
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